The influence of 'regulatory agencies' on pluralism in European administrative law by Chamon, Merijn
 
 
 
The influence of 'regulatory agencies' on pluralism in
European administrative law
Citation for published version (APA):
Chamon, M. (2012). The influence of 'regulatory agencies' on pluralism in European administrative law.
Review of European Administrative Law, 5(2), 61-91.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2012
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 07 Jan. 2021
The Influence of ‘Regulatory Agencies’ on Pluralism in
European Administrative Law
Merijn Chamon*
Academic Assistant, European Institute, Ghent University (Jean Monnet Centre of
Excellence)
Abstract
The pluralism in European administrative law is the result of the
rule of indirect (rather than direct) administration in the execution of EU law.
However, it has already been acknowledged for some time that the classic dichotomy
between direct and indirect administration in the execution of European law no longer
adequately describes the current factual and legal situation. Today, the EU increasingly
relies on ‘hybrid’ forms of ‘shared’ and ‘mixed’ administrations to deliver its policies
in the field. European agencies are such a form of ‘hybrid’ administration where the
EU legislator sought a more uniform application of its legislation but, at the same
time, did not find it expedient to rely on the classic solution of direct administration.
Different EU agencies have been granted varying powers to ‘help implement’ EU law.
Often they are empowered to ‘help’ the Member States in this way. At the same time
the Boards of the EU agencies are dominated by the Member States’ administrations,
bringing these national actors together in an EU forum, begging the question of what
effect different types of EU agencies have on the pluralism in European administrative
law.
1 Introduction
Because the European Union has adopted the German model
of Vollzugsföderalismus in the execution of EU policies, EU harmonisation has
not been as pervasive in national administrative law as it has been in other
fields of law. Apart from the ‘semi-harmonised’ general rules and principles of
administrative law there remains an important procedural autonomy for
Member States, resulting in pluralism in the indirect administration of EU law.
Yet, in recent years the implementation of EU policy cannot be simply classified
as direct or indirect administration anymore, since forms of joint administration
are emerging as well. One of these forms may be witnessed in the increasing
agencification of the EU administration. So far, thirty so called ‘regulatory
agencies’ have been established (excluding those in the CFSP and JHA), formal-
ising and institutionalising the cooperation between national administrators
This paper was originally presented at the Second REALaw Research Forum: Pluralism in
European Administrative Law on 3 February 2012 in Groningen. I would like to thank the
discussant and the participants for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
*
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and regulators. Because of the important role of national administrations
within agencies, the European Commission presents agencies as a form of de-
centralised governance. At the same time, agencies also introduce a strengthened
notion of hierarchy in the EU’s relations with national administrations, begging
the question how agencies influence pluralism, specifically the objectives sought
by it, in the European administrative sphere. Are agencies, given their ‘European’
status, a threat to this pluralism? Or are they, given the important position of
national administrations within these bodies, an instrument of the administra-
tions and a means of joint problem-solving in a pluralistic setting? A first step
towards answering these questions will be taken by looking at the different
roles EU agencies fulfil, with special attention to the recently established
agencies.
2 The Notion of Pluralism
Since this contribution deals with the question how the ‘Plu-
ralism in European Administrative Law’ is influenced by the existence and
functioning of EU agencies it is useful to first share some thoughts on the notion
of pluralism, although the debate of the study of legal pluralism as such will
not be entered into.1 Pluralism obviously refers to a multiplicity and seems to
carry in it a positive connotation. Furthermore, the existing pluralism in
European administrative law is a logical result of the development of national
administrative law predating an ever increasingly pervasive European integration
combined with the adopted model of Vollzugsföderalismus.2 This also explains
why the ‘pluralism in administrative law’ should be understood in the broadest
sense possible as it encompasses the plurality in procedural, material and or-
ganisational law. Notwithstanding the above noted positive connotation and
the ‘naturalness’ of the administrative diversity in the EU, the question whether
this plurality should at all be maintained seems a valid one.
On this debate see M. Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’, in: Cane and Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook
of empirical legal research (New York: Oxford University Press 2010); B. Tamanaha, ‘Understand-
ing Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ [2008 30/3] Sydney Law Review.
1
As regard the issue of pluralism, the German experience cannot be used as a guide since the
administrative law of the Länder and the Bund is largely unified. For instance, the Law of Ad-
2
ministrative Procedure (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) applies to the administration of both levels
of government, unless the Länder have adopted specific laws of administrative procedure. The
Länder have indeed used this option but their own laws on procedure replicate the general
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz. See H. Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (München: Beck
2006), 104-13. The Law on Administrative Courts (Verwaltungsgerichtordnung) also applies to
both the Länder courts (Verwaltungsgerichte and Oberverwaltungsgerichte) and the Federal Admin-
istrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). Furthermore, procedures for revision of judgments
of the Oberverwaltungsgericht are possible before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, also linking both
jurisdictions.
62
CHAMON
It should be noted that no position is taken on the intrinsic value of any
kind of pluralism, in fact it is assumed pluralism is neither intrinsically recom-
mendable nor should it be repudiated. Pluralism may be the former if it serves
a higher good but neither should it be forcefully upheld if no such greater good
results. In the present case, such pluralism may even be a threat to a greater
good. As EU law aims to establish a level playing field and national administra-
tions are made responsible for implementing the common rules and securing
the level playing field in practice, the risk of the higher objective not being
achieved as a result of divergent approaches at the national level does not seem
too speculative. Indeed, this is also the reason why, in the absence of full har-
monisation of administrative law, there still is a framework of ‘semi-harmonised’
general rules and principles of administrative law. The reason why further
harmonisation in this field has not come about is probably a political issue, yet
pluralism under review here may also be justified under EU law from a legal
perspective.
First, pluralism is an expression of the internal diversity of the EU which
the Treaties mandate the EU to take account of and respect when it develops
policies in the social,3 educational,4 cultural (including the trade in cultural
products)5 and environmental6 spheres. In a general sense this diversity is also
protected by the principle of subsidiarity, but of course only in so far as the
competences in question are not exclusive competences under Article 3 TFEU.
The pluralism of European administrative law may be also furthermore justified
from an economic perspective in so far as there is a dialogue between the dif-
ferent national actors from which learning processes on best practices may
grow. If such experiences on best practices are exchanged and later adopted
and implemented by the other national actors, there is no doubt that existing
pluralism in European administrative law should be valued, since it would enable
the EU to better achieve its objectives as that pluralism offers a means with
which to select the most successful or efficient solution to common problems.7
Looking at this pluralism from the perspective of subsidiarity also shows
how far such a justification goes. As Barents noted,8 the subsidiarity principle
entails two tests following the Treaty of Lisbon, firstly the EU may only act when
‘the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States’ and when ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed ac-
See Article 152 TFEU.3
See Article 165 TFEU.4
See Article 167 TFEU & Article 207 (4) a TFEU.5
See Article 191 TFEU.6
From an economic perspective, pluralism also allows for regulatory competition, if such com-
petition leads to a ‘race to the top’ rather than a ‘race to the bottom’ it would also justify plural-
ism.
7
R. Barents, Het Verdrag van Lissabon, Achtergronden en commentaar (Deventer: Kluwer 2008),
388.
8
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tion, [its objectives may] be better achieved at Union level’.9 This would seem
to suggest that as the process of EU integration goes forward and the objectives
of EU policies become more ambitious, the scope remaining for meaningful
pluralism between the Member States could diminish. At the same time this
is not an inevitability either, as long as pluralism does not stand in the way of
sufficiently achieving the objectives. Furthermore, the advantages pluralism
may unlock through learning processes may also be taken into account in what
is essentially an economic efficiency test.
3 The Regulatory Agency10
Before entering the debate of pluralism in European adminis-
trative law it is necessary to make a short remark on the concept of the regulatory
agency as used in the title of this contribution. The term regulatory agency is
used here because it is the term used by the Commission to denote the bodies
currently under review. The Commission has used this term to differentiate
these bodies from the executive agencies,11 which therefore fall outside the scope
of this contribution. The reason for this is quite evident, EU executive agencies
are established by the Commission itself to assist in the direct administration
of EU programmes, whereas pluralism in European administrative law is the
result of the EU’s Vollzugsföderalismus and the rule of indirect administration.
The use by the Commission of the concepts of regulatory and executive
agencies is however quite misleading, as the notion of ‘regulatory’ invokes the
suggestion of a body which has been granted ‘rule-making’ powers. This is of
course not the case. Although important powers have been granted to agencies
which i.a. has them participate in rule making, the formal power to adopt gen-
erally binding norms has not yet been attributed to any agency. Apart from being
misleading, the Commission’s representation of agencies is also inconsistent.
Thus, after having distinguished the regulatory agencies from the executive
agencies, the Commission makes a further distinction in the former category
between decision-making regulatory agencies and executive regulatory agencies.12
For the remainder of this contribution reference will therefore be made to EU
agencies to denote these bodies. These EU agencies are permanent independent
bodies under EU law, established by the EU legislator, which have been endowed
See Article 5 TFEU.9
For an overview of all EU agencies under review here see the list in annex.10
European Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM
(2002) 718 final, p. 3.
11
Ibid., p. 8.12
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with their own legal personality.13 Because the CFSP is still a distinct ‘pillar’ in
the EU’s legal architecture, the agencies active in this field are excluded.14 Al-
though the former third pillar has been completely absorbed by the former first
pillar, the EU agencies in police and judicial cooperation will also be excluded,
again because of their distinct character.15
The EU agencies are then at first sight an anomaly in executive federalism16
(or Vollzugföderalismus) in the EU. They are undoubtedly EU bodies but cannot
simply be considered as direct administration since the Treaties provide that
direct administration is done through either the Commission or the Council.
Furthermore, the administrative boards of these agencies are dominated by
representatives of the national member states17 making them an advanced form
of cooperation between the national administrations.18 This is also why the
question of the effect of these agencies on pluralism in European administrative
law is relevant, EU agencies are not just bodies at European level in which a
supranational logic is dominant.
An important part of the rationale for their creation is the need for adminis-
trative integration, as the Internal Market came about through legislative har-
monisation, the question on the implementation of this legislation also arose.19
Because the EU relies on the Member States for the implementation of EU
policies, controlling the (sufficiently) uniform implementation of common
legislation is not evident. This is different from other federal polities, such as
the United States or Belgium where the federal government uses its own ad-
S. Griller & A. Orator, ‘Everything under control? The “way forward” for European agencies
in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine’ [2010 35/1] 35 ELR 1, 7.
13
These are the following agencies: the European Union Satellite Centre, the European Union
Institute for Security Studies and the European Defence Agency.
14
These are the following agencies: Europol, Eurojust and the European Police College. The
distinctive character of these agencies lies in the distinctive character of the actors they bring
15
together: law enforcers and the judiciary are quite atypical compared to national ministries
and agencies.
K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’ [1991
28/1] CML Rev., 15.
16
Only in the Boards of EFSA and EIGE does not every Member State have its own representative.
In the EFSA the Board is composed of 14 members appointed by the Council in consultation
17
with the Parliament following a proposal by the Commission (see Article 25 of Regulation (EC)
178/2002, [2002] OJ L 31/1). In the EIGE the Board is composed of 19 members, 18 of which
are appointed by the Council following proposals from the Member States and one member
by the Commission (see Article 10 of Regulation (EC) 1922/2006, [2006] OJ L 403/9). In the
Administrative/Management Boards of the ACER, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, a same observation
may be made but within these agencies the task of setting out the work of the agency is granted
to a Board of Regulators (ACER) or Board of Supervisors, where every Member State does have
its representative.
A. de Moor-van Vugt, ‘Netwerken en de europeanisering van het toezicht’ [2011/3] SEW. Tijd-
schrift voor Europees en economisch recht, 100-2.
18
M. Shapiro, ‘The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space’, in: Stone Sweet,
Sandholtz & Fligstein (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2001), 95.
19
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ministration, responsible for the execution of federal legislation.20 Obviously
in such polities, the risk of federal legislation not being implemented uniformly
across the federation’s component members is much lower. Because this risk
is more real for instance in the German Federal Republic, the German Basic
Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), itself provides for different mechanisms to ensure
a proper implementation of federal law by the Länder.21 The GG also foresees
a number of ways in which federal legislation may be implemented, notwith-
standing that federal legislation will normally be implemented by the Länder
in their own right.22 Implementation of federal legislation can also be done by
the Länder on federal commission23 or by the federal administration itself.24
Ziller notes that the rules on administrative oversight by the federal author-
ities are much more detailed in the GG than they are in the EU Treaties, the
latter only containing a general obligation for the Member States to respect
their obligations under the Treaties.25 What is more, there is no equivalent in
the EU Treaties to the implementation on federal commission or assignment
as there is in the GG.26 Because the EU Treaties lack such rules the choice on
how to implement legislation becomes dichotomic without many formal options
in between the two extremes: implementation by the Commission (or Council)
or the Member States themselves. EU agencies then become pragmatic solutions,
striking a delicate balance between the exigency of the effet utile of EU law and
the respect for the sovereignty of the Member States in line with the principle
of executive federalism, which may be regarded as a specific application of the
principle of subsidiarity. Lafarge noted in relation to the development of the
four freedoms, but there is no reason to restrict this insight on EU legislation
on the four freedoms, that each time an EU regime is upgraded, administrative
cooperation is revised in order to become more effective and bring national
administrations closer together.27 Still, according to Lafarge this means the
higher the development of an EU regime, the higher administrative cooperation
between Member States should be. Of course this is phrased rather vaguely,
the important question in relation to pluralism in European administrative law
In the case of Belgium this was no conscious choice but the logical result of a devolution process
turning the unitary Belgian state into a federal state.
20
See Article 84 GG.21
See Article 83 GG.22
See Article 85 GG.23
See Article 86 GG.24
J. Ziller, ‘Multilevel governance and executive federalism: comparing Germany and the European
Union’, in: Birkinshaw & Varney (eds), The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon (Alphen
Aan Den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2010), 270-1.
25
Ibid., 272-4.26
F. Lafarge, ‘Administrative Cooperation between Member States and Implementation of EU
Law’ [2010 16/4] European Public Law, 600.
27
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being when the increasingly ‘greater cooperation’ between Member States
ceases to be simple ‘cooperation’.
Although EU agencies, when seen as a form of administrative integration,
primarily bring together national Member State administrations it should be
noted, for the sake of completeness since this will not further touched upon in
this contribution, they may also affect the national administrations of third
states. First, third states may participate in a number of EU agencies, subject
to the conclusion of an agreement to this end with the EU, if they apply the
acquis relevant to the agency. This applies to the states that are parties to the
European Economic Area, but also to candidate countries which further helps
the latter in adapting their administrations to the exigencies of EU membership.
Second, there are those EU agencies with operational tasks, which also has
them cooperate with third countries. A good example of such an agency is
FRONTEX, which has concluded a series of working arrangements with the
border authorities of a number of third states. These working arrangements
typically provide a structured dialogue between both parties, but the content
depend on the third state in question. For instance, typical for the working ar-
rangements with the countries at the eastern border of the Schengen area are
provisions on the possibility for those countries to participate in Frontex training
programmes, allowing the EU to export its approach to border security (including
its emphasis on human rights). On the other hand, the emphasis in the working
arrangements with the North American countries is on the exchange of infor-
mation, best practices, etc. In the following parts however, the focus will only
be on the EU agencies’ possible effects on Member States’ administrations.
4 Basic Functions of EU Agencies
Looking at the basic functions of EU agencies from the per-
spective of pluralism then reveals a seemingly inherent tension: since the estab-
lishment of agencies has been defined as a form of administrative integration
it seems they are a potential threat to pluralism. This process of how national
autonomy could be increasingly restricted has been described by De Moor-van
Vugt.28 Paraphrasing briefly, the first stage of restricting national autonomy,
according to De Moor-van Vugt, is the adoption of EU legislation in a certain
sector. This harmonisation will normally be done through the adoption of di-
rectives. As was also noted above, a more or less uniform legislation may be
See note 18. Chiti noted in 2000 that The increasing involvement of the EC authorities in the
administrativeaction, however, has not weakened the role of national administrations.’ The
28
process of agencification has in the meantime however taken further qualitative steps, so that
it may be doubted Chiti would still defend this position. See E. Chiti, ‘The Emergence of a
Community Administration: The Case of European Agencies’ [2000 37/2] CML Rev., 342.
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subverted if the Member States take on too diverging positions when they im-
plement these directives. In the second stage therefore, the Commission will
‘weave a web’ bringing different actors together in an informal manner, sup-
porting this process financially and setting up an information strategy. In the
third stage the information strategy is replaced by a more formal network
strategy, which often includes the establishment of an agency which is put ‘on
top’ of the network. The best practices, which were already identified in the
second stage are also adopted in new sectoral legislation. In the fourth stage
the procedural and institutional autonomy of the Member States is further
curtailed, uniform requirements are imposed by and at the EU level and the
role of the EU agencies is enhanced.29 The fifth stage, De Moor-van Vugt
speculates, could then see an almost complete centralisation of competences
at the EU level, which will then under strict conditions be delegated back to the
authorities and structures at the national level, which will execute their tasks
‘in subcontraction’ for the EU. Although De Moor-van Vugt constructed her
argument in terms of national autonomy, it also applies to pluralism, as the
latter may be seen as the result of national autonomy.
On the other hand, since agencies are permanent bodies bringing together
administrations of the Member States, they may provide durable forums which
may serve to exchange best practices, as was also noted by De Moor-van Vugt.
Since this function has been identified as an important economic motive justi-
fying pluralism, agencies may also allow pluralism to fulfil its economic func-
tion. After all, pluralism is of little economic use if it does not unlock greater
efficiencies. Looking back at the model of De Moor-van Vugt, it seems that if
agencies are to fulfil this function, the Europeanisation of supervision should
ideally halt in the third phase, since beyond that phase ‘dialogue’ is replaced
more and more by ‘imperium’.30 A lot will depend on the ‘intensity’ of the in-
teraction between the agency and the national actors and between the latter
themselves. This will have to be verified ‘on the ground’, by checking the spe-
cific activities of the agencies. This is because the notion of the agency, an EU
body bringing together different national actors, is only conducive to such in-
teraction but is in itself not sufficient. The administrative boards of the different
agencies for instance, usually bring together a representative from each national
administration,31 but these boards only meet a few times a year at the most, the
effect on pluralism then being minimal.
De Moor-van Vugt also sees an enhanced role for the Commission because of this process, but
a legitimate question here seems whether in reality not only national administrations but also
the Commission loses out in the process of agencification.
29
Imperium is used here to describe the use of the command of law to achieve policy objectives.
See also T. Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Government’, in: Jowell and Oliver (eds), The Changing
Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), 213.
30
See supra n. 17.31
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It should be noted that other authors are less gloomy than De Moor-van
Vugt. Egeberg for instance, sees EU agencies as controlled by national agencies
and the Commission32 and their main function as the homogenous implemen-
tation of EU law.33 Egeberg’s optimistic stance may be explained from his bot-
tom-up perspective, since he sees the rise of EU agencies also as a result of the
agencification at national level, representing EU agencies as the meeting place
of these national bodies. In reality however, the national representatives within
EU agencies do not all come from ‘independent national agencies’ but also
from the ministries. Furthermore one could wonder whether EU legislation
itself is not a driving force behind national agencification instead of vice versa.34
As De Moor-van Vugt showed, the trigger of the creation of an EU agency may
be a bottom up process, as in the case of the European Environmental Agency
(EEA) where the Member States’ authorities had first set up a network on a
completely voluntary basis. That network and the initiative was later taken over
by the Commission and then imposed top down, fundamentally changing the
position of the national authorities in this ‘European cooperation’.
Translating the abstract framework worked out by De Moor-van Vugt to the
concrete practice of EU agencies raises a typical issue in the doctrine on these
bodies: because agencies are not foreseen in the Treaties and because a hori-
zontal framework for these bodies is also still lacking in secondary law,35 EU
agencies are established ‘ad hoc’. This means that they vary widely with regard
to tasks, competences and therefore also the possible effect they have on national
administrations and pluralism under review here. The precise impact of agencies
on administrative pluralism will hence have to be verified for each agency indi-
vidually. The next hurdle in this regard is that the regulation establishing an
agency does not give a proper account of its powers and the role it fulfils in its
specific sector. For this, attention needs to be paid to the entire sectoral legisla-
tion, since the different regulations and directives adopted to regulate that sector
may also refer back to the regulation establishing the agency and grant it addi-
M. Egeberg, ‘L’Administration de l’Union Européenne: Niveaux Multiples et Construction
d’un Centre’ [2010/133] Revue française d'administration publique, 25. Egeberg also speaks of the
32
greater autonomy and the strengthening of the Commission, but a review of the competences
granted to the recent agencies in the financial sector (cf. infra) would cast doubt on this obser-
vation.
Ibid., 24.33
See for instance the obligation to establish independent national regulatory authorities in the
gas and electricity sector imposed on Member States by Article 39 of Directive (EC) 2009/73
34
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ 2009 L 211/94.
The Commission had announced such a horizontal framework in its White Paper on Governance
in 2001. See also M. Chamon, ‘EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?’ [2010
35
17/3] MJECL, 298-304; F. Comte, ‘2008 Commission Communication “European Agencies –
The Way Forward”: What is the Follow-Up Since Then?’ [2010 3/1] REALaw, 65-110. The (pro-
visional?) endresult of the negotiations between the Institutions is the non-binding Common
Approach on decentralised agencies, concluded in June 2012.
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tional powers or tasks. On top of this, the wording of the provisions in a regu-
lation establishing an agency may be quite vague, containing no more than the
proverbial ‘seeds’ from which an influential role may grow.
One way of overcoming the ‘ad hoc’ problem is trying to identify the most
invasive agency functions based on a specific typology of agencies. The hurdle
here then is that a traditional typology of agencies based on the extent of their
prerogatives, such as the Commission distinction between executive and de-
cision-making agencies,36 does not help us identify those agencies which have
the greatest impact on administrative pluralism. For instance, one of the first
agencies that had been granted the power to take individually binding decisions
was the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM). Market op-
erators may apply for a Union Trademark or Design at this agency, which will
then review the application and check whether it meets the conditions laid down
in legislation before registering the trademark or design. The OHIM un-
doubtedly is one of the most important agencies in size and workload,37 but its
effect on the pluralism of administrative law is minimal.38 The establishment
of the OHIM has not done away with the national intellectual property regimes
and offices. Of course the directive harmonising the trademarks and designs
legislation of the Member States39 is identical in content to the rules which the
OHIM follows and which are laid down in its establishing regulation,40 but this
harmonisation is distinct from the establishment of the OHIM. The agency as
such does not therefore affect the national administrations or their functioning.
A starting point for identifying the most interesting agencies from the per-
spective of administrative pluralism, is Chiti’s functional classification. He re-
marks that agencies have mainly been granted administrative powers, which
are instrumental to the decision-making of national and European authorities,41
although calling EU agencies instrumental to the functioning of national au-
thorities suggests that they merely ‘assist’ national authorities. Chiti further
sets out three types of agencies, based on a functional classification. The first
type are information agencies, ‘responsible for the production and dissemination
See text at note 12. For a more elaborate typology of this kind see S. Griller & A. Orator, ELR,
o.c.
36
The OHIM has a total staff of 705 and in 2010 received 189 984 applications. See Office for
Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Annual Report 2010, 2011,
4-5.
37
But even the OHIM, which operates autonomously from national IP offices, does have well-
established contacts with its national counterparts, see ibid., 13.
38
Directive (EC) 2008/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council to approximate the
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ L 299/25.
39
See Regulation (EC) 207/2009 of the Council on the Community Trade Mark, OJ 2009 L 78/1;
Directive (EC) 2008/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council to approximate the
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ L 299/25.
40
E. Chiti, ‘An important part of the Eu’s institutional machinery: Features, problems and per-
spectives of European agencies’ [2009 46/5] CML Rev., 1403.
41
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of high quality information in certain specific sectors.’ The second type have
advisory or technical assistance functions towards national and European au-
thorities. The third have ‘genuinely final, decision-making administrative
powers.’42
As mentioned, this kind of classification as such does not say much about
the impact of agencies on national authorities. Therefore, for Chiti’s first type
of agencies it should be verified whether the ‘high quality information’ is pro-
duced without any resulting obligations, or whether it results in some kind of
standard, which is then set for the national authorities. For the second type,
whether their ‘assistance’ is again noncommittal or whether it sets up a strait-
jacket for national authorities should be verified. Last, the question for the third
types of agencies is to which actors their decisions may be addressed, private
parties or national authorities. In the former case the next question will be
whether the European agency has a concurrent power to that of the power of
the national authorities, i.e. whether the agencies may take decisions which
could have been taken by the national authorities or whether the powers of the
agency and national authorities do not compete directly, as is the case with the
OHIM. In case the agency has been granted the power to issue decisions vis-à-
vis national authorities, the impact on the autonomy of these authorities is of
course evident. This exercise will not be undertaken for every agency, but in
each category some interesting aspects of existing agencies will be highlighted,
with a predominant focus on the most recent agencies of the ‘third wave’.43
Before commenting further on these issues, two general remarks must be
made. First, the three main categories of agencies which will be dealt with
should not be seen as distinct, but should rather be seen as pyramid structured
with the information agencies at its base and the decision-making agencies at
the top. This implies that, generally, as one goes up the pyramid the different
functions add up to each other, meaning a decision-making agency, in general,
will also have information and assistance tasks. Normally then, observations
on the first type of agencies will also be relevant to the other types of agencies.
A second observation is on the qualitative dimension of agencification, recently
this process has not only seen the establishment of decision-making agencies
in economically important sectors,44 but even the recent ‘assistance’ agencies
hold more far reaching powers than their older counterparts and when existing
agencies’ regulations are being reviewed this often entails extending the agency’s
mandate. With this in mind a closer look will be taken in the next section at
Ibid., 1403-4.42
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the different types of agencies and their effect on administrative pluralism
within the EU.
4.1 Information Agencies45 and Pluralism
Information agencies only have modest powers. In a nutshell,
they gather, analyse and disseminate information. For this, they rely for a large
part on the national administrations, but some also have their own scientific
committees. It is clear that this information function itself creates a new situ-
ation, which national administrations will have to take into account.46 Apart
from this, the agencies also function as a centre of expertise for the European
institutions, in the first place the Commission. The European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) for instance has been mandated to ‘assist
the Commission, where called upon, in the technical preparatory work for up-
dating and developing legislation in the field of network and information secu-
rity.’47 The subsequent harmonisation measures may then further restrict the
autonomy of the national administrations, although it is clear the agencies as
such will not have this effect, they are merely being involved in the classic pro-
cess of harmonisation.
Some information agencies have also been given the task of setting up or
coordinating a network, bringing national administrations together. It will be
these information agencies which, through the activities of their network, will
have the greatest impact on national administrations. This is so because their
institutionalised network offers the most durable forum for dialogue between
Apart from the agencies mentioned below, other information agencies are the European Centre
for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), the European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) and the European Training
Foundation (ETF).
45
When national authorities retain the right under EU law to adopt (emergency) measures on
grounds of public health or for the protection of the environment, this is made subject to the
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condition that the Member State concerned adduces new (scientific) information. The Court
of Justice has clarified that the Member State should rely for this on the most reliable scientific
evidence available and the most recent results of international research. See e.g. Case C-236/01
Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others [2003] ECR I-8105, para. 113. If EU agencies live up
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weight is an acceptable dose of BPA, meaning its scientific opinion does not support such a
total ban. The EFSA then announced it could reconsider its position in 2012 following the
publication of new data from studies which are being carried out in the USA. The Commission
for its part announced that it would reconsider its position on BPA following the EFSA report.
Article 2 (4) of Regulation (EC) 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council es-
tablishing the European Network and Information Security Agency, OJ 2004 L 77/1.
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national administrations. In this regard, De Moor-van Vugt described how an
information agency with only modest powers, in casu the EEA, may contribute
to further administrative integration. She described how the Commission ini-
tially undertook various initiatives to secure the enforcement of EU environmen-
tal law, one of which was the establishment of the agency. This agency has been
granted the task of establishing and coordinating a network, EIONET, which
serves to collect, process and analyse data.48 De Moor-van Vugt further explained
how this network then allows the most pressing shortcomings in the existing
framework of environmental regulation to be identified and how best solutions
to these problems may then be proposed. In some cases this even involves
specific guidelines on enforcement measures, which can then be taken up by
the Commission or the legislator and be put into binding obligations.
Two points should be raised here, first, it is clear the impact of an agency
may only be indirect, as it itself will not have the power to impose such binding
requirements. Second, the line between exchanging ideas and adopting a
standard may be very thin. It will not be possible therefore to ascertain the
precise impact of information agencies on administrative pluralism from a
reading of the establishing regulations. What may be ascertained from the es-
tablishing regulations are certain preconditions: if the regulations provide for
durable forums in which national experts can meet and attach some ‘meaning’
to the dialogue within these forums, then the regulations will have established
agencies which may have the impact described by De Moor-van Vugt, but this
effect will not be predetermined. This also has to do with what Martens has
called the multi-interpretability of regulations setting up agencies.49 Specifically
for the EEA, Martens noted that an information agency may serve different
purposes within a political system and that the EEA Regulation itself provides
little answer to the question of what role the EEA is to play within the EU sys-
tem.50 Obviously this observation goes for other information agencies as well.
Taking a closer look at the provisions on EIONET in the EEA Regulation,
one does see the regulation imposes a number of obligations on the Member
States. Thus the Member States need to keep the EEA informed of their own
national environmental networks but also other national institutions which
could contribute to the work of the EEA, since their entire territory should be
covered to the fullest extent possible. This provision indirectly imposes an obli-
gation on the Member States to establish a network that covers their entire
territory, since this will be the means to achieve the obligation laid down in the
Article 2 (a) of Regulation (EC) 401/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observa-
tion Network, OJ 2009 L 126/13.
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regulation. Second, the Member States are under an obligation to cooperate
with and assist the agency to achieve the objectives set out in the agency’s work
programme. The Member States are also encouraged to set up general focal
points, which act as a national point of contact for the EEA and specific topic
centres, but these are no concrete obligations.
The data, which are brought together within EIONET then serve as a basis
for the reports drawn up by the EEA. It is important to note these are not only
reports on specific issues in environmental policy (e.g. waste, water, chemicals,
etc.) but may also focus specifically on (national) policy measures and instru-
ments.51 These reports will inspire the Commission not only to propose envi-
ronmental policy objectives, which the Member States will have to meet, but
also further define the policy measures which should be used to achieve the
objectives.
Another information agency is the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), which has five main tasks according to Article
2 of its establishing regulation.52 The agency has to collect and analyse data,
improve data-comparison methods, disseminate data, cooperate with European
and international bodies and third countries and inform Member States if it
identifies new developments or trends. To this end Article 5 of the Regulation
provides the Agency shall have the European Information Network on Drugs
and Drug Addiction (Reitox) at its disposal. That Article also provides the
Member States have to designate a focal point, unlike in the EEA Regulation
where there is no such formal obligation, and that each Member State has to
bring together the different national organisations active in the field of drug
policy in order to bring together all relevant data. This innocuous provision will
of course compel the Member State in question to set up some national struc-
tures linking these different national organisations. Furthermore, to achieve
comparable data the EMCDDA and the network have worked out five key indi-
cators and the network is mandated to work out guidelines for the implemen-
tation of these indicators. The focal points of the Member States will then have
to adhere to these guidelines. With regard to the key indicators, the eighth re-
cital of the preamble to the Regulation provides that ‘The implementation by
Member States of those indicators is a precondition for the Centre to perform
its tasks as set out in this Regulation.’ If this provision is read together with the
general principle of sincere cooperation as laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU, it
might be argued the soft law of the key indicators is rather hard. Member States
also have to provide the network with information in accordance with Article
4 (1) of Council Decision 2005/387/JHA which foresees in a standard reporting
See for instance European Environmental Agency, Market-based instruments for environmental
policy in Europe, Technical Report 8/2005.
51
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form. Although most requirements imposed on the Member States by the re-
vised EMCDDA regulation, following the review of the agency’s mandate, may
be modest overall, it is important to note they are much more restrictive than
the requirements set out in the original EMCDDA regulation.53
The establishing regulation of EU-OSHA also provides that the agency has
an information role in that it collects, analyses and disseminates information
to i.a. identify good practices and that it brings together national administra-
tions.54 The provisions on the territorial coverage of the network established by
EU-OSHA for this purpose are identical to those that may be found in the EEA
Regulation. And just like in the EMCDDA Regulation, the Member States are
under an obligation to designate focal points and should inform EU-OSHA of
those national institutions which could serve as topic centres. Unlike in the
case of the EMCDDA, the EU-OSHA Regulation does not explicitly foresee its
network adopting guidelines that could bind the Member States.
The European Institute on Gender Equality (EIGE) also has an information
role to fulfil and also has the duty to set up and coordinate a network on Gender
Equality to foster the exchange and dissemination of information including
between non-governmental organisations.55 The Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA) established a network, the Fundamental Rights Platform, bringing non-
governmental actors together.56 These two agencies show that it is not whether
it is an agency established or coordinated by the EU but the type of actors which
are brought together in those networks that is important.
4.1.1 Conclusion
Although all information agencies will have some effect on
national administrations those that coordinate a network of national authorities
(rather than national civil society organisations) have been identified as the
most interesting agencies when it comes to pluralism in EU administrative law.
Still, even within this specific category of information agencies substantial dif-
ferences on the role and purpose of these networks as defined in legislation
may be noted. Some agencies have a clear mandate to draw up certain guidelines
vis-à-vis national actors, but even without such a clear mandate this possibility
should not be excluded, although in the latter case this will be more dependent
upon the positive interaction between national and European actors (cf. infra).
See Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) 302/93 of the Council on the establishment of a European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, OJ 1993 L 36/1.
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4.2 Assistance Agencies57 and Pluralism
As regards the assistance agencies, a major distinction may
be made between those agencies established to assist the Commission and
other EU institutions and those that mainly or additionally assist the Member
States. Thus, the European Medicines Agency (EMA)58 and the European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA)59 are engaged primarily in providing the Commission
with scientific opinions. Griller and Orator also call them pre-decision-making
agencies as they are responsible for the risk assessment, preceding the Com-
mission risk management function.60 Although these agencies will also have
some impact on national authorities, they are closer to the Commission than
the national authorities. The focus should therefore be on those agencies assist-
ing national authorities and their impact on administrative pluralism depending
on what ‘assisting’ entails.
Article 1 (2) of the Regulation establishing the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA) already gives a hint as to how agencies might ‘assist’ the
Member States since the EMSA will provide the latter ‘with the technical and
scientific assistance needed, in order to help them to apply the Community
legislation properly, [and will]monitor its implementation and to evaluate the
effectiveness of the measures in place.’61 The agency has also been granted in-
spection powers as regards the effective implementation of maritime legislation
by the national authorities under Article 3 of the Regulation. However, here
again the establishing Regulation does not give a full account of the inspection
powers of the agency, since it also fulfils an inspection function under the
Regulation on ship and port facility security.62 Article 8 of that Regulation
provides the Commission may undertake inspection visits to check compliance
with the relevant rules. Although the EMSA is not even mentioned in this
Regulation, in reality it will be EMSA officials that are mandated by the Com-
Apart from the agencies mentioned below, other assistance agencies include: the European
GNSS Agency (GSA), the European Railway Agency (ERA), the Translation Centre for the
Bodies of the European Union (CdT), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC), the Office of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC
Office), European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) and the Agency for the
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice.
57
Regulation (EC) 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down Com-
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mission to do these security checks.63 A similar (partial) outsourcing of tasks
by the Commission may be noted in relation to inspection visits relating to
other EU maritime legislation.64 The EMSA’s role is however not confined to
assistance and inspection, as it also monitors Member State compliance with
EU legislation. This is specifically the case for compliance with Directive on
the minimum level of training of seafarers, which explicitly foresees this role
for the EMSA.65
To support its training function, the EMSA has also set up a Consultative
Network for Technical Assistance and cooperation (CNTA). In this network the
national administrations meet once a year to discuss the training opportunities
with the EMSA. Within the CNTA it will then be determined where the needs
of the national administrations lie and which training courses will be organised.
Here it should be noted these training courses need not necessarily be restricted
to the exchange of best practices but may also relate to common procedures or
enforcement practices. Groenleer and others have noted that the constructive
position taken by the EMSA towards the national authorities differs from the
position originally taken by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The
latter agency initially engaged in a more top down approach, which led to re-
sentment at the national level.66 What will therefore matter more generally is
not only which formal powers have been conferred on an agency and the
agency’s ability to establish itself as a centre of expertise but also the way in
which it engages with the national authorities. Despite its more modest powers,
the EMSA had a far prompter impact on national administrations compared to
the EASA.
The Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) is another assistance
agency and is a good illustration of the argument developed by De Moor-van
Vugt. The CFCA’s original establishing Regulation only provided the agency
with coordination and research tasks to help the Member States better imple-
ment the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).67 As a result of its bad performance
the CFP is continuously under reform and the CFCA’s mandate was therefore
extended in 2009 when the Council adopted a new regulation amending the
existing control system so that the CFCA could ‘support the uniform implemen-
tation of the control system of the common fisheries policy, ensure the organ-
European Maritime Safety Agency, Work Programme 2011, 34.63
Ibid., 36-8.64
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isation of operational cooperation [and]provide assistance to Member States.’68
For this the CFCA may now issue manuals on harmonised standards of inspec-
tion and develop guidance material on the best practices on the control of the
CFP. The CFCA’s role was thus extended from simply coordinating national
efforts to issuing soft law instruments directed at the national control authorities.
Apart from these changes the CFCA was also granted the power to acquire
equipment necessary to implement its joint deployment plans which it draws
up under its coordination function. Although this does not affect national au-
thorities as such, it does make the CFCA less dependent on the national author-
ities goodwill in fulfilling its operational tasks. A similar observation may be
made concerning the latest amendment in 2011 of the Regulation establishing
Frontex, an agency with mainly operational powers.69 In the past, Frontex had
to rely on the goodwill of the national authorities to have sufficient personnel
and material for its operational missions. This cooperation did not always run
smoothly as Member States were not under a binding obligation to put personnel
and equipment at the agency’s disposal even if they had committed themselves
to do so. Although Frontex still does not have its own ‘European Border Guards’
the obligation on Member States to honour their commitments has been
strengthened70 and Frontex has received the power to acquire or lease its own
equipment,71 reducing its dependence on the Member States.
At first glance a last interesting addition to the CFCA Regulation from this
contribution’s perspective is the new Article 17c (2) on the agency’s role of facil-
itating cooperation between Member States and the Commission so as to come
to harmonised standards for control. According to the Regulation this should
be achieved ‘[w]ith due regard to the different legal systems in the individual
Member States.’ Such a clause may also be found in Article 2 (e) of the EMSA
Regulation on a common methodology for investigating maritime accidents, a
clause inserted by the Council in its common position on the Commission’s
redrafted proposal.72 These clauses therefore seem to protect the existing plu-
ralism between national legal systems, although this is quite out of place in a
‘harmonisation-provision’. Notwithstanding the general wording of these pro-
Paragraph 41 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 of the Council establishing a
Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries
policy, OJ 2009 L 343/1.
68
Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Oper-
69
ational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ
2011 L 304/1.
See Article 3b Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of the Council establishing a European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union, OJ 2004 L 349/1.
70
See Article 7 of the Frontex Regulation.71
See Common Position (EC) 33/2002 of the Council of the European Union, OJ 2002 C 119/E27.72
78
CHAMON
vision they should, given the subject matter, be interpreted as shielding the
Member States’ criminal law from the reach of the agencies, rather than pro-
tecting administrative pluralism.
Last, a very recent assistance agency is the European Asylum Support Office
(EASO)73 established to reduce the disparities between the Member States on
the implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).74 EASO’s
Regulation states that it has three main duties, the first one being an information
function in part comparable to that of the agencies noted above. Part of its as-
sistance function centers around training provided to national functionaries,
not only civil servants, but also national judges. Here it is interesting to note
that the possible harmonisation effect of these training activities was recognised
by the Council, which inserted the following clause in Article 6 (1): ‘Participation
in training is without prejudice to national systems and procedures.’ Such a
clause only works pre-emptively however to the extent that it rules out that
training activities would result in any legally binding obligations, but does not
prevent training activities from resulting in a de facto new standard. Furthermore
Article 6 (2) provides the EASO will not only manage, but also develop the
European asylum curriculum.75 A second main duty is the support for Member
States subject to particular pressures, which is more of an operational task. The
third main duty then is its contribution to the CEAS for which the EASO will
draw up reports ‘with the aim of improving the quality, consistency and effec-
tiveness of the CEAS.’76 Apart from these reports it will also adopt technical
documents on the implementation of the asylum instruments of the Union,
which includes guidelines and operating manuals. The Regulation clarifies that
these technical documents will not ‘give instructions to Member States about
the grant or refusal of applications for international protection’,77 implying all
other possible instructions are not excluded per se. On this power, Comte also
cautiously predicts that it ‘permet probablement d'envisager à terme une certaine
influence d'EASO sur les systèmes d'asile des États membres.’78 According to
Comte, the weight these technical documents carry will ultimately result in a
certain ‘valeur juridique’, where they will inspire many Member States in the
implementation of their asylum policies.79 Finally, it is under this third duty
that the possibility for the EASO to set up factual, legal and case law databases
Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European Asylum Support Office, OJ 2010 L 132/11.
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on asylum instruments is found. This would i.a. allow judges from different
Member States to keep track of legal developments (including case law) in
other Member States. As such this would open up the possibility of real ‘national
European law precedents’ to which Van Harten has alluded.80 To illustrate the
rapid evolution of agencification, attention may be drawn to Comte’s remark in
that the creation of an agency for the EU’s asylum policy would have been un-
imaginable only ten years ago.81 Indeed, when the Commission proposed its
communication on an Open Method of Coordination (OMC) for the Common
immigration policy in 2001,82 Barbou des Places noted that such an OMC initi-
ative would not be sufficient, but could be a starting point for institutionalised
competition (i.e. learning and best practices) and cooperation between Member
States.83 From this perspective the EASO is indeed a giant leap forward, and
away from non-committal means of cooperation and a much more institution-
alised approach than an OMC.
4.2.1 Conclusion
Although the agencies whose function it is to assist other
European bodies or institutions may also influence the functioning of national
authorities, it will be the agencies established to secure a more uniform imple-
mentation by the Member States of existing legislation, that merit special atten-
tion. From a first reading of their establishing regulations, their role seems
quite innocuous. After all, they are established to secure a level of implementa-
tion the legal obligation of which already flows from the legislation in place. If
they restrict existing pluralism it is only because the existing body of legislation
preempts such pluralism. Furthermore, the example of EMSA seems to indicate
that for agencies to have any meaningful impact or influence it is necessary
they engage with national authorities on an equal footing. In this way the na-
tional authorities and the agency engage in a problem-solving exercise in which
best practices are identified and promoted. The existing pluralism therefore
fulfills its economic function, resulting in less pluralism.
The noted trend of establishing an agency and afterwards amending its
mandate by extending it and providing the agency with more far-reaching
powers, i.a. making it more independent from national authorities, is a different
H. van Harten, 'National Judicial Autonomy: The Example of National European Law Precedents
in the Dutch Case-Law on the Free Movement of Services and the Freedom of Establishment',
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matter however. Of course, it is hard to make a case against this based on a
subsidiarity argument, which may be seen as a pluralism-safeguard, since
whenever the mandate of an agency is amended this is done through secondary
legislation and in the preamble of such legislation, the justification of the Uni-
on’s action in light of the principle of subsidiarity is given. This justification
will then be analogous to the justification initially given when the agency was
first established: deficiencies in the implementation of a given body of legislation
have remained and in order to remedy this, the agency requires new or extended
powers and capabilities. This may then alter the relationship between national
authorities and the agency and further curtail the remaining pluralism at na-
tional level. Recent developments in the establishment of new agencies and the
review of existing ones seem to suggest that the Member States are increasingly
wary of the impact of the agencies in the field of criminal law and on the national
judicial function, but a similar concern regarding the impact of agencies on
national administrations does not seem to exist. Agencies’ mandates for instance
are still being drawn up in general, multi-interpretable, wording. This would
seem to suggest that, on a political level, the agencies’ effects are seen as the
necessary consequence (or byproduct) of the legislation, which they help imple-
ment.
What should be noted is that an assistance agency may fulfill a number of
distinct ‘assistance tasks’, unlike the information agencies whose tasks are po-
tentially not as diverse. The example of EASO shows how one agency may
combine the tasks of providing training, drawing up authorative soft law and
giving operational support to Member States and this in a sensitive policy field.
The accumulation of these different tasks may create interesting synergy effects.
This aspect of synergy effects will be even more important for the decision-
making agencies of the following section, since they have potentially the
broadest scope of tasks.
4.3 Decision-making Agencies and Pluralism
As was mentioned above, the first question for the last category
of agencies is on who they interact with. Agencies such as the OHIM or the
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) mainly interact with private parties
applying for IPR protection under EU rules. As they only interact indirectly or
incidentally with national authorities they are less relevant from the perspective
of this contribution. The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) is similar in this
regard since its main function is to help implement the ambitious REACH
project. Still, in its assistance role84 the Forum for Exchange of Information on
See the remark supra on the pyramidal nature of the categorization of agencies used.84
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Enforcement (Forum), one of ECHA’s bodies,85 is worth mentioning. This
forum again brings together the different national administrations responsible
for the enforcement of EU chemicals’ legislation. According to Article 77 (4) of
the REACH Regulation this forum is i.a. responsible for spreading good prac-
tices; proposing, coordinating and evaluating harmonised enforcement projects
and joint inspections; coordinating exchange of inspectors; developing working
methods for local inspectors; developing an electronic information exchange
procedure; etc. It is clear that if the forum fulfils these functions to the fullest
this could result in a further de facto harmonisation of the enforcement practices
of national administrations, working on the basis of the same information,
through the same procedures, evaluated against equal standards. The forum
meets a number of times a year and has adopted its own Rules of Procedures
(RoP),86 which prescribes that it should establish for itself a work programme.87
In its work programme,88 the forum has identified a number of work packages
on which working groups are active, allowing interested parties to keep track
of the Forum’s work.
Because the REACH project is quite ambitious and to allow the ECHA to
focus on its main function the Member States have been charged with estab-
lishing national helpdesks to provide private parties, which need to comply with
the REACH legislation, with the necessary information.89 Here the establish-
ment of an agency is accompanied by an obligation on the Member States to
establish supporting bodies for that agency, imposing institutional changes to
the national administrative system.
The case of the EASA is comparable to that of the ECHA, albeit that it is
more complex. Just like ECHA its main decision-making function is directed
at private parties. This is the agency’s certification power, which extends over
airworthiness and environmental certification. Following the extension of its
mandate, EASA has acquired (limited) powers on pilot certification, air operation
certification and air traffic controller certification.90 In this, EASA’s competences
The Forum is established in Article 86 of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction
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ment Board, Rules of Procedure for the Forum for Exchange of Information on Enforcement,
MB/35/2011 final.
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See Article 2 (4) of the RoP.87
ECHA Management Board, Forum Work Programme 2011-2013, MB/36/2011 final.88
See Article 124 of the REACH Regulation.89
For these competences to materialise the Commission still needs to adopt the necessary imple-
menting Regulations.
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are mainly non-concurrent with those of the national authorities.91 Two main
exceptions exist in this regard. First, under Article 14 of the EASA regulation
Member States remain competent to adopt emergency measures. Second, apart
from its certification function, the EASA also holds ‘quasi-regulatory’92 powers.
As was noted above, ‘regulatory power’ implies the agency has some competence
to adopt generally binding measures, although this is still not the case for EASA,
the agency does have competence to issue opinions which may be deemed to
be de facto binding. First, according to Article 19 of the EASA Regulation the
EASA will prepare draft measures for the Commission if the latter wishes to
make a legislative proposal or if it wishes to adopt delegated or implementing
acts. When the latter develop technical rules, the Commission may not change
their content without prior coordination with the agency.93 Thus those sub-
sequent measures that implement parts of the Regulation for which national
administrations have remained competent, will be drafted by the EASA itself.
Because of EASA’s role in the legislative process, it will also influence to a
large extent any further legislative harmonisation and will therefore have an
impact on the national administrations. The second ‘quasi-regulatory’ power
is the competence to issue certification specifications and guidance material
for the application and implementation of the Regulation, according to Article
18. These codes do not formally have force of law, but are regarded as binding
by the industry.94 However, since the Regulation not only sets out the mandate
of the EASA, but also includes provisions applicable to the national authorities,
as regards those tasks for which they are still responsible, the EASA also has
the power to adopt guidance material applicable to the implementation of EU
law by the national authorities.95
Article 24 of the EASA Regulation provides that the agency will conduct
standardisation inspections to monitor the application of the Regulation and
all further implementing measures. Unlike in the case of EMSA, the Commis-
sion has adopted an implementing regulation further setting out the modalities
See for instance Annex II to the EASA Regulation which lists the types of aircraft which fall
outside the scope of the Regulation and for which, as a consequence, the national authorities
are still competent.
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T. Tridimas, ‘Community Agencies, Competition Law, and ECSB Iniatiatives on Securities
Clearing and Settlement’ [2010/28] Yearbook of European law, 236.
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See Article 17 (2) b of the EASA Regulation.93
P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), 157.94
See for instance Regulation (EU) 805/2011 of the Commission laying down detailed rules for
air traffic controllers’ licences and certain certificates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008
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of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ 2011 L 206/21. This Regulation further
provides for a harmonised regime for licensing in air traffic controllers. Although there is one
common regime, the Member States are still competent on the licensing of their own controllers,
whereas the EASA is the competent authority for those organisations located outside the EU’s
territory. Because both apply the same rules, EASA’s guidance material also applies vis-à-vis
the national authorities.
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that apply to this inspection function.96 This implementing Regulation further
reveals how the EASA may have a significant impact upon the national author-
ities, even when it is not exercising any ‘decision-making powers’. The EASA
will inspect how the competent national authorities have implemented the ap-
plicable rules. It will make a report of its findings and send this to the Commis-
sion, the Member State concerned and to its competent authority. The Commis-
sion then may, but does not have to, forward this report to the other authorities.97
As Groenleer and others noted,98 the fact that this information is not automat-
ically shared between all national authorities curiously goes against one of the
basic tenets of agencification, i.e. information and best-practices sharing.99 Fol-
lowing the inspection, the EASA will agree with the national authority concerned
on an action plan to remedy the deficiencies found during the inspection. If no
action plan may be agreed upon or the deficiencies are not remedied in a timely
manner, the EASA will forward the issue to the Commission.
The case of EASA shows the extent of the synergy effects that may result
from the combination of multiple tasks. The EASA has been granted the power
to propose new (legislative or implementing) rules to the Commission. Once
such rules are adopted, the EASA has the power to adopt soft law, interpreting
those rules. EASA then also has the power to inspect the Member States’ au-
thorities’ implementation of EU rules. Following its inspection it will draw up
a plan (together with the national authority) to remedy the deficiencies in im-
plementation that the inspection revealed.
As was mentioned above the most interesting decision-making agencies, in
their decision-making function, are those that have powers concurrent to those
of the national authorities. These agencies are the latest addition to the EU’s
agency arsenal and combine pervasive decision-making powers with activities
in sensitive economic sectors, marking a qualitative leap in the process of
agencification.100 Thus, in 2009 the EU legislator established the Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and in 2010 it established the three
European Supervising Authorities (ESA’s) in the financial sector, which only
Regulation (EC) 736/2006 of the Commission on working methods of the European Aviation
Safety Agency for conducting standardisation inspections, OJ 2006 L 129/10.
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See Article 10 of Regulation (EC) 736/2006.97
M. Groenleer, M. Kaeding & E. Versluis, JEPP, o.c., 1225.98
Another curious element, although this falls out of the scope of the present contribution, is
the role of the Commission, which is alien to the inspection process up until the decision to
99
forward inspection reports to other national authorities. The exception here are the ‘ad hoc
inspections’ provided for under Article 16 of the implementing Regulation, which are conducted
upon request of the Commission.
See M. Chamon, supra at n. 44, 1056.100
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started their work last year.101 The following part will focus on the three financial
agencies.
The Regulations establishing these agencies have been adopted simultane-
ously since the agencies make up an important part of the new regime of finan-
cial supervision in the EU following the financial crisis. Furthermore, the pro-
visions of the three Regulations are also parallel to each other. In the next part,
reference will therefore be made to the generic European Supervising Authority
(ESA) since the observations will apply for both the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA.
A closer look at the powers of the ESA’s reveals they have similar functions
to those of the EASA, although an inspection function is lacking. This is com-
pensated by a reinforced ‘quasi-regulatory’ and decision-making function. As
regards the latter it should be noted the ESA may not only adopt decisions vis-
à-vis private parties, in casu financial institutions, but also vis-à-vis the national
authorities. Such a power distinguishes them from the other agencies.102 The
three situations in which the ESA will have the power to take binding decisions
are a breach of EU law by a national authority,103 in emergency situations104 and
when national authorities disagree in cross-border situations.105 If there is a
breach or a non-application of relevant EU legislation, the ESA may, of its own
motion, start an investigation and afterwards provide a recommendation to the
national authority. If the national authority does not act upon this recommen-
dation, the Commission may issue a formal opinion addressed to the national
authority, taking account of the agency’s original recommendation. If the na-
tional authority does not comply with the Commission’s formal opinion, the
ESA itself may adopt necessary decisions vis-à-vis those financial institutions
under the supervision of the non-compliant national authority, thereby circum-
venting the latter’s competence.
In the case of an emergency situation, the ESA’s will receive the same
powers, but they will not need to rely on a formal opinion from the Commission.
The three ESA’s are the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Oc-
cupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority
101
(ESMA). Their establishing Regulations are Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision
2009/78/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/12; Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occu-
pational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission
Decision 2009/79/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/48; Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and
Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision
2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/84.
With the exception of course of the ACER.102
See Article 17 of the ESA Regulations.103
See Article 18 of the ESA Regulations.104
See Article 19 of the ESA Regulations.105
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Instead, the Council will need to declare the existence of an emergency situation
and up until it revokes that declaration, the ESA’s will be able to exercise the
powers of addressing decisions to national authorities or directly to financial
institutions under their supervision if the former do not comply with the ESA’s
decisions. The procedures are similar in the last case when disagreement exists
between national authorities. In such a case they may request the competent
ESA, or in some specific cases that ESA may act upon its own motion,106 to act
as a mediator in a ‘conciliation phase’. If no agreement may be found between
the national authorities, the ESA will be able to step in and apply binding de-
cisions upon them. Should the national authorities not comply with this de-
cision, the ESA may again direct decisions directly to the financial institutions.
It should be noted that this latter power in the three situations described, is
without prejudice to the possibility for the Commission to start infringement
proceedings and to take the Member State concerned to the Court of Justice.
Quite evidently such a power which directly interferes with the competences
of the national authorities is very invasive and would have been unthinkable
some years ago. At first glance, the national authorities do seem protected from
the ESA, since in the case of an alleged breach of EU law, it will need to rely on
the Commission’s formal opinion and the existence of an emergency situation
that is determined by the Council,107 while national authorities themselves have
to invite the ESA to mediate when disagreements arise. However, as was noted,
in some specific cases the ESA may also ‘mediate’ out of its own motion. This
will be so in two cases, firstly when specific EU rules grant such a power to the
ESA and ‘where on the basis of objective criteria, disagreement between com-
petent authorities from different Member States can be determined.’ The last
condition seems to leave a lot of discretion to the ESA, since objective criteria
may be quite subjective. For the first condition, Article 19 (1) refers back to Ar-
ticle 1 (2) which lists the relevant legislation, but which also provides ‘all direc-
tives, regulations, and decisions based on those acts, and of any further legally
binding Union act which confers tasks on the Authority.’
In the light of the quasi-regulatory powers of the ESA, the meaning of that
provision becomes clear: Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon
and the new comitology regulation,108 the old comitology system has been re-
placed by the system of delegated acts and implementing acts under Articles
See Article 19 (1) second sentence of the ESA Regulations.106
Note that in the original Commission proposal the power to declare the existence of an emer-
gency situation was also granted to the Commission. See Article 10 in the original proposal in:
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European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a European Banking Authority’, COM (2009) 501 final.
Regulation (EU) 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules
and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commis-
sion’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ 2011 L 55/13.
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290 and 291 TFEU.109 These Treaty provisions foresee a central role for the
Commission to adopt these acts, whereby a formal role is foreseen for the Par-
liament and Council in the adoption of delegated acts and a formal role for the
national administrations is foreseen in the adoption of implementing acts. The
Regulations of the ESA’s restrict the role of the Commission in the adoption
of these delegated and implementing acts and give a central role to these
agencies, of course only for those acts falling within the scope of the legislation
as defined in Article 1 of the ESA’s Regulations. The Regulations prescribe the
procedure to adopt ‘regulatory technical standards’ (delegated acts) and ‘imple-
menting technical standards’ (implementing acts). In short these are simply
drafted by the ESA’s, although the Treaties grant this power to the Commission.
Pursuant to the Treaty provisions, these standards still have to be formally
adopted by the Commission however the Commission may not change the
content of these drafts ‘without prior coordination’ with the agency. Paragraph
23 of the preamble to the Regulations even provides:
‘The Commission should endorse those draft regulatory technical standards
[…] [t]hey should be subject to amendment only in very restricted and extraordi-
nary circumstances [this would be so] if they were incompatible with Union
law, did not respect the principle of proportionality or ran counter to the funda-
mental principles of the internal market for financial services as reflected in
the acquis of Union financial services legislation.’
This means the ESA’s take up the central role in the adoption of the rules,
which also define their own mandate, including i.a. the situations in which it
may impose decisions on national authorities of its own motion. As centres of
expertise, the ESA’s will of course also assist the Commission when it is drafting
new legislative proposals for the financial sector, although this role is less
formalised.
Article 16 further provides that the ESA’s will issue guidelines and recom-
mendations to national authorities. A novelty in this compared to the soft law,
which other agencies may adopt is the implicit confirmation in the Regulations
themselves that this soft law is binding on national authorities, since the Regu-
lations also provide for follow up procedures. The national authorities not only
have to ‘make every effort to comply with these guidelines and recommenda-
tions’ but also have to report back to the ESA on whether and how they intend
to comply with the guideline or recommendation. The ESA will keep track of
this and forward the information on non-compliant authorities to the Commis-
sion, Council and Parliament, at the same time outlining how it intends to en-
sure future compliance by the national authorities. The fact that it has been
recognised so clearly in the Regulations that such soft law is only relevant if it
P. Craig, ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New Comitology Regulation’ [2011 36/5]
ELR, 671-86.
109
87
THE INFLUENCE OF ‘REGULATORY AGENCIES’ ON PLURALISM IN EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
is de facto binding, is remarkable. Again these guidelines and recommendations
may relate to all relevant EU legislation on the financial sector, including the
delegated and implementing acts which the ESA’s themselves draft.
The reason why such far-reaching powers could be granted to the ESA’s
may be partly explained by the Regulations’ provisions on the decision making
within the ESA’s. The competent body in the powers reviewed above is the
Board of Supervisors, which is composed of representatives of the national au-
thorities themselves. As a rule however they decide by simple majority, but
when the Board exercises a ‘quasi-regulatory’ function it has to decide using
QMV.110 Powers are therefore taken away from the national authorities at na-
tional level and given back to them at the EU level, albeit in a mixed setting
with supranational and intergovernmental characteristics.
Again one may note the synergy effects which are created because of the
ESA’s combination of tasks. Although the ESA’s do not have inspection func-
tions, they do propose new financial regulation to the Commission. As regards
the ESA’s proposal for delegated acts, the Commission’s discretion in accepting
the ESA’s drafts is even formally restricted. The ESA’s further adopt soft law
for the Member States authorities, who are instructed to make every effort to
comply with the soft law. Lastly, the ESA’s may not only step in and take decision
in lieu of the national authorities, but through their quasi-regulatory function
the ESA’s are also competent to further define the situations in which they may
exercise these exceptional powers.
4.3.1 Conclusion
Taking a closer look at the decision-making agencies has re-
vealed they do not necessarily have a greater impact on national administrations
than ‘less-powerful’ assistance agencies, notwithstanding the fact that they are
generally deemed to be the more significant type of agency. From the perspective
of the pluralism in European administrative law the ‘quasi-regulatory’ powers
seem more relevant, since through this function the agencies will not simply
help national authorities to implement EU rules, but will also influence the
content of these rules. In the case of the EASA this is reinforced by its inspection
power, granting it not only influence over the adoption of relevant rules and
assisting Member States on implementing them, but also checking up on this
implementation afterwards. An inspection function has not been granted to
the ESA’s, but instead all inter-institutional niceties have been abandoned and
the Regulations now clearly provide the Commission should follow the expert
opinion of the ESA’s when it adopts delegated and implementing acts. Likewise
it has been made clear to the national authorities that the soft law adopted by
See Article 44 of the ESA Regulations.110
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the ESA’s is far from noncommittal. As regards the decision-making function
itself, the possibility for the ESA’s to adopt decisions vis-à-vis the national au-
thorities or circumvent the latter and addressing decisions directly to financial
institutions is a serious blow to the autonomy of these authorities, especially if
the ESA’s can do so out of their own motion or when they may rely on a
supranational institution such as the Commission to trigger such a competence.
The combination of these powers is indeed a threat to pluralism in the admin-
istrative sphere. The actual functioning of the ESA’s will determine whether
this risk will also materialise. If so, a next question would then be whether the
ESA’s functioning is still in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Attention
was also drawn the synergy effects which result from the accumulation of dif-
ferent tasks and greatly strengthen European agencies vis-à-vis national author-
ities and therefore further put pressure on the existing pluralism in European
administrative law.
5 Conclusion
The question of how EU agencies may influence existing
pluralism in European administrative law is not a straightforward one to answer.
Agencies have diverse roles and their formal powers enumerated in the es-
tablishing regulations give only a partial account of their actual functioning.
This is because these provisions are often multi-interpretable and because in-
formal powers or conventions also play a role, determining the impact of
agencies on other actors at the European and national levels.
The basic function of most agencies is to ensure a more homogenous im-
plementation of EU law. Even if this affects pluralism in European administra-
tive law, it might be argued that this pluralism is not affected by the agency as
such but only by the legislation which it helps implement. The networks co-
ordinated by these agencies even help unlock the efficiencies of pluralism which
would otherwise remain mere potentialities. Information agencies will then
only affect administrative pluralism if they act as a catalyst for the Commission,
driving the Commission’s programme of further and deeper integration, includ-
ing greater obligations being imposed on national administrations.
The same might be said of assistance agencies, which do no more than help
Member States implement EU obligations already imposed upon them. Al-
though these agencies do have a greater impact on national authorities, it can
still be said these agencies engage in concert with the national authorities in
problem-solving exercises. This would mean the latter still have control over
the output and impact of the EU agency. Here it should nevertheless be noted
that following the review of the establishing regulation, the agency’s mandate
is often amended and thus far, to the benefit of the agency’s powers and inde-
pendence. The relation between the EU agency and its national counterparts
then changes fundamentally if the former becomes ever less dependent on the
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latter. The role of the agency will be furthermore strengthened if synergy effects
are produced from the combination of different ‘assistance’ tasks by the agency.
These effects enable the agency to not just merely ‘assist’ national administra-
tions in implementing EU law but also to become a further driving force of
integration in its own right.
Last, the old decision-making agencies as such only have a marginal impact
on the noted administrative pluralism since their decision-making power is
only directed towards private parties and in a non-concurrent way to the com-
petences of national authorities. The experiment of EASA in which an agency
was endowed with quasi-regulatory powers was further elaborated with the es-
tablishment of the ESA’s. These latter agencies combine unseen ‘assistance’
powers vis-à-vis the Commission and assistance powers vis-à-vis the national
administrations with unseen decision-making powers enabling them to issue
recommendations to national authorities and bypassing them if need be. In
particular, the combination of these powers, and the synergies that result from
it will see these authorities becoming the real centerpiece of the EU system of
financial supervision. Apart from their questionable effect on the EU institutions
themselves, notably the Commission, it could be said these powers also are a
genuine threat to existing administrative pluralism. From a legal point of view
the question would then be whether the ESA’s functioning passes the subsidi-
arity test. Taking a broader perspective, another question is whether the ESA’s
have set the standard for a new type of agency or whether the exceptional cir-
cumstances for which and in which they were established has resulted in three
unique agencies which will not serve as a template for future agencies.
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs Agencies
European Union’s Judicial Cooperation UnitEurojust
European Police OfficeEUROPOL
European Police CollegeCEPOL
European Union Satellite CentreEUSC
European Union Institute for Security StudiesEUISS
European Defence AgencyEDA
Information Agencies
European Agency for Safety and Health at WorkEU-OSHA
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions
EUROFOUND
European Environment AgencyEEA
European Centre for the Development of Vocational
Training
CEDEFOP
European Institute for Gender EqualityEIGE
Fundamental Rights AgencyFRA
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Assistance Agencies
Mainly assisting EU institutions and bodies
European Medicines AgencyEMA
European Training FoundationETF
European Food Safety AuthorityEFSA
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European
Union
CdT
European GNSS AgencyGSA
Agency for the operational management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and
justice
IT Agency
European Institute of Innovation and TechnologyEIT
Mainly assisting Member States
Community Fisheries Control AgencyCFCA
European Agency for the Management of Operation-
al Cooperation at the External Borders of the Mem-
ber States of the European Union
FRONTEX
Office of the Body of European Regulators for Elec-
tronic Communications
BEREC Office
European Asylum Support OfficeEASO
European Centre for Disease Prevention and ControlECDC
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction
EMCDDA
European Maritime Safety AgencyEMSA
European Network and Information Security AgencyENISA
European Railway AgencyERA
Decision-making Agencies
Agencies with non-rivalling competences
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal MarketOHIM
Community Plant Variety OfficeCPVO
European Chemicals AgencyECHA
Agencies with rivalling competences and/or quasi-regulatory competences
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority
EIOPA
European Banking AuthorityEBA
European Securities and Markets AuthorityESMA
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy RegulatorsACER
European Aviation Safety AgencyEASA
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